

## Message Text

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W

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FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9479

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 TEL AVIV 8104

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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM ATHERTON

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR IS US

SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN  
MINISTER ALLON

1. SUMMARY. IN AMBASSADOR TOON'S AND MY TWO-HOUR MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER ALLON AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL MFA EVRON DECEMBER 22, I REVIEWED IN GENERAL TERMS MY DISCUSSIONS IN ARAB CAPITALS, EMPHASIZING THAT PRINCIPAL PURPOSE OF MY TRIP WAS TO GET ACROSS OUR VIEWS ON JANUARY SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE IN ORDER THAT THERE BE NO MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT LIMITS BEYOND WHICH U.S. COULD NOT GO. I ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT THIS WAS NOT A REPORT FOR THE CABINET AND ANY LEAKS ABOUT TALKS IN ARAB CAPITALS WOULD BE HIGHLY EMBARRASSING TO US. I SAID THAT I HAD SEEN NO PARTICULAR SIGN OF GIVE IN SYRIAN POSITION BUT HAD IMPRESSION THAT SARG HAD NOT YET THOUGHT THROUGH ITS STRATEGY. I DID NOT GO INTO BILATERAL MATTERS I HAD DISCUSSED ON MY TRIP WITH EXCEPTION OF BOYCOTT/VISA ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO SAUDI ARABIA, WHERE I POINTED OUT RISKS TO LARGER OBJECTIVES IN PUBLICIZED CAMPAIGN AGAINST SAUDI PRACTICES. ALLON REVIEWED ALONG LINES PREVIOUSLY REPORTED ISRAEL'S DISAPPOINTMENT WITH USG VOTE FOR RESOLUTION 381. BASED ON ALLON'S STATEMENTS IT SEEMS THAT GOI IS LOCKED INTO NON-PARTICIPATION IN JANUARY DEBATE. ALLON MADE PROPOSAL THAT WE MAKE ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO HAVE PLO EXCLUDED AS PARTICIPANT IN DEBATE BUT I TOLD HIM THAT I BELIEVED THIS WAS NON-STARTER, ALTHOUGH I WOULD REPORT HIS VIEWS TO WASHINGTON. I ALSO MADE POINT THAT I BELIEVED IT WAS TIME

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TO PUT BEHIND US DIFFICULTIES WHICH HAVE ARISEN IN OUR

RELATIONSHIP OVER THE PAST FEW WEEKS AND STOP APPROACHING EVERY ISSUE AS A CONFRONTATION. END SUMMARY.

2. I BEGAN CONVERSATION BY OUTLINING TO ALLON PURPOSE OF TRIP, I.E., SECRETARY BELIEVED IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR ME TO TAKE A SWING THROUGH KEY MIDDLE EAST CAPITALS, IN PARTICULAR DAMASCUS, IN ORDER TO MAKE CLEAR TO SARG LIMITS BEYOND WHICH WE COULD NOT GO IN FORTHCOMING SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE. SECRETARY FELT IT IMPORTANT THAT THIS MESSAGE BE DELIVERED IN ALL KEY ARAB CAPITALS SO THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE ANY MISUNDERSTANDINGS NOR MISCALCULATIONS WITH RESPECT TO OUR POSITION. I THEN PROCEEDED TO OUTLINE IN GENERAL TERMS MY DISCUSSIONS COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY TO ALLON.

3. SYRIA. I TOLD ALLON THAT I HAD MADE POINT TO SYRIANS THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO FORCE THE INCLUSION OF THE PLO AS A PARTICIPANT IN NEGOTIATIONS WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO US. OUR POSITION ON THIS ISSUE WAS CLEAR: THAT IS, ANY ADDITIONAL PARTICIPANTS TO THE NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE AGREED UPON BY ALL THE ORIGINAL PARTICIPANTS AND, AS LONG AS PLO DID NOT ACCEPT ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST AS A SOVEREIGN STATE AND DID NOT ACCEPT THE SAME NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK AS THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS (SC RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338), WE COULD NOT RECOMMEND TO ISRAEL THAT IT SHOULD HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE PLO. I HAD ALSO MADE CLEAR IN MY TALKS IN DAMASCUS THAT THE SYRIAN PROPOSAL TO TRANSFER THE NEGOTIATIONS FROM GENEVA TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL WAS TOTALLY IMPRACTICAL FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW AND WAS SOMETHING WITH WHICH WE COULD NOT GO ALONG. I EXPRESSED HOPE TO SYRIANS, AS I DID TO OTHER ARAB LEADERS I SAW, THAT PRESENT NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK WOULD BE PRESERVED IN JANUARY SECURITY COUNCIL SESSION AND THAT OUTCOME OF DELIBERATIONS WOULD KEEP OPEN NEGOTIATING PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE. I MENTIONED TO KHADDAM

AND ASAD THE OTHER OPTIONS THAT WE BELIEVED WERE STILL OPEN (RECONVENING OF GENEVA WITH ORIGINAL MEMBERSHIP, PREPARATORY CONFERENCE, OR ADDITIONAL GOLAN NEGOTIATIONS), BUT REACTION ON SYRIAN PART WAS NEGATIVE. I EMPHASIZED TO ALLON THAT I HAD NOT MADE TRIP TO SYRIA TO NEGOTIATE OR SUGGEST SPECIFIC ALTERNATIVES, BUT SIMPLY TO STAKE OUT A CLEAR U.S. POSITION AS TO OUR PARAMETERS ON JANUARY DEBATE. I SAID TO ALLON THAT I HAD IMPRESSION THAT SYRIA HAD NOT YET WORKED OUT IN A PRECISE FASHION ITS SECURITY COUNCIL

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TACTICS AND IN THAT REGARD I BELIEVED THAT MY TRIP HAD BEEN TIMELY.

4. JORDAN. I TOLD ALLON THAT I WENT OVER BASICALLY SAME GROUND WITH JORDANIANS THAT I HAD COVERED WITH SYRIANS, BELIEVING THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT JORDAN BE AWARE OF WHAT I HAD TOLD SARG GIVEN CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WHICH HAS BEEN EVOLVING BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. ALLON ASKED IF I HAD RECEIVED ANY INDICATION THAT JORDAN MIGHT BE CONSIDERING

INCLUSION OF THE PLO IN ITS DELEGATION IF GENEVA WERE TO RECONVENE.  
I SAID THAT WHILE I HAD PROBED A BIT ON THIS POINT, NO CLEAR  
INDICATIONS  
EMERGED. I HAD IMPRESSION THAT HUSSEIN HAD SOME RESERVATIONS ABOUT  
HIS CLOSER RELATIONSHIP WITH SYRIA ALTHOUGH THE KING NEVER SPELLED  
THIS OUT PRECISELY. ALLON THEN ASKED IF THE KING HAD STUCK TO THE SAME

LINE ABOUT NOT ATTENDING GENEVA. I REPLIED THAT THE KING HAD  
REITERATED  
HIS BASIC POSITION, NAMELY THAT PALESTINIAN ASPECTS OF A SETTLEMENT  
HAD TO BE DEALT WITH BY PLO BUT KING HAD LEFT OPEN OPTION OF GOING TO  
GENEVA AS A CONFRONTATION STATE.

6. SAUDI ARABIA. I NOTED THAT I HAD HAD MEETINGS WITH KHALID,  
SULTAN AND FAHD DURING MY BRIEF VISIT TO JIDDA. ONE OF MAIN  
PURPOSES IN MY VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA, IN ADDITION TO DISCUSSING  
UPCOMING SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE, WAS TO REVIEW BILATERAL MATTERS.  
I TOLD ALLON THAT, AS A RESULT OF RECENT CONGRESSIONAL ACTION RE  
BOYCOTT ISSUE AND SAUDI VISA POLICY, SAG HAD BECOME INCREASINGLY  
NERVOUS. I REALIZE THAT ISRAEL AND U.S. VIEWED THESE ISSUES FROM  
DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES BUT BELIEVED GOI WOULD AGREE WITH OUR VIEW  
THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO KEEP SAUDI ARABIA

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9480

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 TEL AVIV 8104

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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM ATHERTON

CLOSELY LINKED TO U.S. TO SUM UP, ON ONE HAND I SOUGHT TO REASSURE  
SAUDIS AND ON OTHER TO EMPHASIZE PRIVATELY DIFFICULTIES THAT SAUDI  
POLICY IN THESE TWO SPHERES WERE CAUSING US.

7. LEBANON. ALLON THEN ASKED ABOUT DISCUSSIONS WITH AMBASSADOR GODLEY CONCERNING SITUATION IN LEBANON. I REVIEWED THIS SUBJECT ALONG LINES PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, STATING THAT IT WAS GODLEY'S IMPRESSION, AS WELL AS OURS, THAT THERE WAS VERY LITTLE THAT ANYONE OUTSIDE OF LEBANON COULD DO TO BRING AN END TO THE FIGHTING. BASIC PROBLEM WAS THAT EXTREMISTS ON BOTH SIDES HAD SEEMED TO HAVE GAINED UPPER HAND, THEREBY MAKING IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR MODERATES OF BOTH MOSLEM AND CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES TO MAKE NECESSARY ADJUSTMENTS IN LEBANESE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL STRUCTURES WHICH WERE NECESSARY IN ORDER TO STOP THE FIGHTING. ALLON QUERIED ME ABOUT SYRIAN ROLE IN CONFLICT. I RESPONDED THAT ON ONE HAND SYRIA DID NOT WANT TO SEE LEBANON DISINTEGRATE BUT AT SAME TIME LONG-TERM SYRIAN INTERESTS IN LEBANON INTRODUCED DEGREE OF AMBIVALENCE IN THEIR POLICY. ALLON EXPRESSED FEAR THAT MOSLEMS WOULD EVENTUALLY GAIN UPPER HAND IN LEBANON WITH CHRISTIAN ROLE GRADUALLY DIMINISHING OVER TIME BUT DID NOT HAVE ANY PARTICULAR IDEAS ABOUT WHAT USG COULD DO.

8. EGYPT. IN MY DISCUSSIONS WITH SADAT AND FAHMY, I EMPHASIZED THE DANGERS WE SAW IF SC DEBATE WERE TO GET OUT OF HAND WITH BIDDING GOING ON BY VARIOUS ARAB PARTIES FOR MORE AND MORE EXTREMIST RESOLUTIONS. I HAD FEELING THAT EGYPT WAS NOT PARTICULARLY ENTHUSIAST  
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ABOUT DEBATE BUT FELT IT HAD NO OTHER CHOICE, GIVEN EGYPTIAN FEELING OF VULNERABILITY AS A RESULT OF SYRIAN REACTION TO SINAI DISENGAGEMENT  
T  
AGREEMENT. SADAT HAD TOLD ME THAT EGYPT REMAINED COMMITTED TO SINAI II AND TO POLICY IT HAD BEEN PURSUING, WHATEVER IT MIGHT SAY IN SC  
DEBATE. ALLON INTERJECTED THAT ISRAEL WAS DISAPPOINTED OVER RECENT EGYPTIAN ACTIONS SUCH AS INITIATIVE IT TOOK IN ICAO RE JERUSALEM AIRPORT AS WELL AS STANDS IN UN ON PLO AND ZIONISM.

9. I THEN TOLD ALLON THAT I WOULD BE INTERESTED IN HEARING WHATEVER HE HAD TO SAY AS I KNEW SECRETARY WOULD BE. ALLON REVIEWED ISRAELI UNHAPPINESS ABOUT OUR VOTE FOR RESOLUTION 381 ALONG LINES PREVIOUSLY REPORTED BY AMBASSADOR TOON.

10. I RESPONDED THAT ALLON WAS AWARE OF OUR VIEWPOINT ON THIS MATTER AS HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY EXPRESSED BY YOU TO DINITZ AND BY TOON TO RABIN AND ALLON. ALLON THEN SAID MFA HAD CONDUCTED STUDY AND BELIEVED THAT IT WAS STILL POSSIBLE TO BLOCK PLO PARTICIPATION IN JANUARY DEBATE. HE NOTED THAT THERE WOULD BE CHANGES IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AFTER THE FIRST OF THE YEAR AND AN EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO BLOCK PLO PARTICIPATION BY A SIMPLE MAJORITY  
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I RESPONDED THAT I DID NOT HAVE EXPERTISE IN THIS AREA BUT MY IMPRESSION WAS THAT WE SIMPLY DID NOT HAVE VOTES IN SECURITY COUNCIL TO BRING ABOUT OUTCOME WITH ALLON HAD OUTLINED. FOR ONE THING NEW LINE-UP IN SECURITY COUNCIL APPEARED TO BE EVEN WORSE FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW THAN ONE WHICH PASSED RESOLUTION 381. GIVEN THIS JUDGMENT, WE BELIEVED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT U.S. AND ISRAEL MADE PLANS FOR DEBATE WITH PLO BEING PRESENT. I HAD MADE POINT IN DAMASCUS AND OTHER CAPITALS WHAT WE COULD NOT DO; IT WAS NOW IMPORTANT FOR US TO SIT DOWN AND DISCUSS WHAT WE COULD DO. I SAID THAT WE FELT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE IF ISRAEL WERE NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DEBATE. IN EVERY ARAB CAPITAL

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I HAD BEEN TOLD THAT FOR YEARS ISRAEL HAD SAID IT WOULD MEET AROUND THE TABLE WITH ITS ADVERSARIES AND THAT ISRAEL WANTED RECOGNITION OF ITS RIGHT TO EXIST BY THE PALESTINIANS. ARAB LEADERS HAD SAID NOW ISRAEL IS REFUSING TO SIT DOWN. WHAT WAS ISRAEL RUNNING AWAY FROM?

11. ALLON RESPONDED HOW COULD SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING WITH PLO PRESENCE POSSIBLY HELP NEGOTIATING PROSPECTS. WHAT POSITIVE ACTION COULD CONCEIVABLY COME OUT OF SUCH A MEETING? HE FOR ONE DID NOT SEE ANY. I SAID THAT FOR ONE THING IT MAKES IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR US IF ISRAEL IS ABSENT. IT MAKES IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR US IN TRYING TO INTRODUCE REASONABLENESS IN THE FACE OF UNREASONABLENESS. OTHER PARTIES WOULD VIEW ISRAELI NON-ATTENDANCE AS CONTUMACIOUSNESS, AND ISRAEL'S IMAGE WOULD SUFFER. AMBASSADOR TOON ASKED IF ISRAEL HAD MADE A FINAL DECISION NOT TO ATTEND SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING. ALLON RESPONDED THAT ISRAELI POSITION HAD BEEN STATED IN DECEMBER 1 CABINET COMMUNIQUE WHICH STATED THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT ATTEND. ONLY CIRCUMSTANCE UNDER WHICH ALLON THOUGHT ISRAEL WOULD CHANGE ITS MIND WOULD BE IF PLO WERE NOT TO ATTEND.

12. ALLON THEN SAID THAT IF MEETING DOES TAKE PLACE, THERE WERE CERTAIN PRINCIPLES ON WHICH U.S. AND ISRAEL SHOULD BE IN FULL AGREEMENT. FIRST, THERE SHOULD BE NO CHANGE, DIRECT OR INDIRECT, AT ALL IN RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. SECONDLY, SECURITY COUNCIL SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO ADOPT ANOTHER RESOLUTION WHICH WEAKENED THE VALIDITY OF 242 AND 338. ALLON REFERRED TO OUR PREVIOUS MEMORANDA OF AGREEMENT TO SUPPORT THESE TWO POSITIONS. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD BE DISCUSSING THESE MATTERS WHEN

HE ARRIVED IN WASHINGTON NEXT MONTH.

13. ALLON THEN ASKED WHAT USG MEANT WHEN IT SAID THAT IT WOULD NOT DEAL WITH PLO AS LONG AS IT DID NOT RECOGNIZE ISRAEL'S RIGHT OF EXISTENCE. HE BELIEVED THAT THIS "CONDITIONAL U.S. POSITION" DID NOT ENCOURAGE MODERATE PALESTINIAN LEADERS TO REACH AN ACCOMMODATION WITH ISRAEL BECAUSE IT LEFT OPEN POSSIBILITY THAT AT SOME POINT USG MIGHT DEAL WITH ISRAEL.  
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PLO. I RESPONDED THAT OUR POSITION WAS AS STATED IN THE SEPTEMBER MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT. OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS WOULD OPPOSE ANY CHANGES TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338 WHICH WERE NOT COMPATIBLE WITH THEIR ORIGINAL PURPOSE, WE WOULD CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT ADDITIONAL PARTICIPANTS IN GENEVA REQUIRED AGREEMENT OF ALL THE ORIGINAL PARTICIPANTS, AND WE WOULD NOT DEAL WITH PLO UNLESS IT ACCEPTED ISRAEL'S EXISTENCE AND SC RESOLUTIONS 242 AND 338. IN CLOSING, I TOLD ALLON THAT I WANTED TO SHARE WITH HIM A PERSONAL OBSERVATION ON STATE OF U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONS OVER PAST FEW WEEKS. IT SEEMED THAT EVERY DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN US HAD ALMOST BECOME A CONFRONTATION. THIS WAS SOMETHING WE HAD TO AVOID IN THE WEEKS AND MONTHS AHEAD.  
TOON

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